Serbia: Tug of War over Remains of Yugoslavia (IV)
The struggle over the future of former Yugoslav lands has entered another decisive period. Part IV: Blueprint for further disintegration.
Rudy Weissenbacher - Feb. 16, 2007
There is no compromise in sight on the future of the Serbian Province of Kosovo between representatives of the Albanian majority in Kosovo, Kosovo Serbs, and the Republic of Serbia. Self-government of the province within the Republic of Serbia, as it would be accepted by the Serbian government, would be opposed by the Kosovo-Albanians.
This decision turned out to be ambivalent. Ahtisaari had been the envoy who delivered to Belgrade the conditions to stop the NATO attack against Yugoslavia in 1999 which appears to have been perceived as challenge to impartiality. Reports on how he supposedly delivered these conditions were communicated in media close to Slobodan Milošević's government, and will have made their impacts even if they were propaganda as the International Crisis Group (ICG) suggested. (International Crisis Group 1999: 4)
Furthermore, between 2000-2004 Mr. Ahtisaari was Chairman of the ICG, an organization that has many important players of the "international community" on its board that were involved in Yugoslavia – including the NATO attack (for example Wesley Clark and Joschka Fischer). (International Crisis Group 2004) While Mr. Ahtisaari was ICG chairman, it produced a comprehensive report with "key recommendations":
"For Kosovo, that the reality, legitimacy and permanence of the split from Serbia be acknowledged; that early Kosovo-wide elections be held to establish a democratic leadership; that the final political settlement process then be commenced; and that the option of "c o n d i t i o n a l independence� be closely explored." (International Crisis Group 2001: X)
Finally in August 2006, Ahtisaari's image of impartiality was strained when he was said to have accused Serbs of a collective guilt. The Serbian negotiation team accused him to act against his mandate and to jeopardize the UN-mission. (B 92 2006, Jovanović 2006, Wood 2006)
Two of the permanent members, Russia and to a lesser extent China, have signalled reservation against changing the border status of the Republic of Serbia without its approval. In a report of November 2006, the International Crisis Group (ICG) urged to speed up the process. It also summarized its "recommendations":
"The six-nation Contact Group that has sponsored the process must at minimum deliver timely endorsement of the settlement package that UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari should present before January’s end, and the UN Security Council must pass a resolution superseding 1244 (1999) to allow the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to transfer its responsibilities to Kosovo’s government and pave the way for new international bodies being readied by the EU. Acting together, the U.S. and the EU need to show the political will to recognise Kosovo as independent, and fend off partition moves from Serbia and the Serb north of Kosovo." (International Crisis Group 2006: i)
"Kosovo’s relative stability over the past year should not encourage the international community to imagine it has the luxury of finessing both sides. It has already indulged a
Serbian constitutional process intended to undermine the international community’s plans for Kosovo, helping thereby to consolidate Belgrade behind retrogressive electoral practices and ideologies of the Milosevic era." (International Crisis Group 2006: i)
ICG seems to have laid out matrix and timetable for its former president and now UN envoy Ahtisaari. The Serbian position that the UN Security Council cannot declare the province of Kosovo independent itself is considered "legally perfect but politically hopeless":
"Instead, the burden could be carried jointly by an enabling Security Council resolution that would endorse Ahtisaari's eventual package, wind up UNMIK and stipulate the details of a successor international presence, and by an act of self-determination by Pristina. Early ideas favoured a “take it or leave it� Kosovo referendum on the settlement package. Concerns that this would be too time-consuming, likely to spiral out of control and incite counter-referendums led top reference instead for the Kosovo Assembly to endorse the settlement package and declare independence on its basis, attracting thereafter recognitions from individual countries and, presumably, EU member states en bloc."(International Crisis Group 2006: 1)
Had it not been for the Russians, the process would have been quicker, in the language of ICG, it would have been put through with a "guillotine":
"[...] Russia has subsequently hardened its rhetoric against an imposed settlement and continues to resist the guillotine favoured, if now somewhat more provisionally, by the other Contact Group members for the process." (International Crisis Group: 2)
The talks have presumed after September 15, 2006, when UN Deputy envoy Albert Rohan considered the talks to have dead-ended. Considering the nature of these talks, it is not a surprise that these talks went nowhere:
"In divining results from the Vienna dialogue, UNOSEK has necessarily calibrated in favour of Pristina: it will have the responsibility of implementing the eventual settlement and is the international community’s partner in Kosovo institution-building [...] strongly encouraged by Western diplomats to believe that the process will result in independence. [...] Although not explicitly stated, the main purpose of the Vienna process has been to find a viable future for Kosovo Serbs within an independent Kosovo." (International Crisis Group: 3)
And it is with this respect that ICG considers the negotiation on part of Serbia successful. With neither the "international community" to admit having a plan B (DerStandard.at 2007a), nor the Serbian government (Standard 2007), it seems likely that one position will be defeated. The power relations do not leave much doubt over the outcome. The EU structure in Kosovo, mentioned in the Ahtisaari-plan which has not yet reached the UN Security Council, is already being prepared. (Xharra 2007)
The Ahtisaari-plan seems to adhere to the ICG blueprint for a kind of disguised independence of Kosovo. It is unacceptable for the Serbian state because it will be the first step to permanently alter its border. But it also seems to run into resistance of Kosovo-Albanians who see too much accommodation for Kosovo Serbs.
The acting Serbian government, which refused to talk to Mr. Ahtisaari when he visited Belgrade to present his plan, argued that it was not in the position to take decisions for a new government (currently being negotiated) and managed to postpone further talks in Vienna until February 21, 2007. In its constituting session on February 14, 2007, the newly formed Serbian parliament rejected the Ahtisaari-plan but agreed to send a negotiating team to Vienna. (DerStandard.at 2007b) The ICG blueprint envisages, however, a quick procedure for the first half of 2007:
"The value of a quick process in the Security Council is considerable. Upon its culmination, the U.S. could quickly recognise Kosovo. EU recognition may be less straightforward: “the harder and messier it is in New York, the more difficult it will be in the EU�. It will probably fall to the German EU presidency, from 1 January to 30 June 2007, to organise this. However, early clarity from the EU and its member states will be crucial: the office of the International Community Representative and its accompanying police and justice mission that are projected to follow on from UNMIK are to be mainly EU-resourced; preparing for eventual EU accession will be the key strategic goal for the young state as it consolidates its institutions." (International Crisis Group 2006: 1)
DerStandard.at (2007a): Rohan: Verhandlungslösung im Kosovo-Konflikt nicht möglich. Interview with UN vice envoy Albert Rohan. (February 12, 2007)
DerStandard.at (2007b): Parlament wies UNO-Vorschlag Ahtisaaris zum Kosovo zurück. (February 16, 2007)
Der Standard (2007): "Alles außer UN-Sitz und Armee." Interview with the chief adviser of Serbian premier Vojislav Koštunica. In: Der Standard, February 10/11, 2007. p. 5.
International Crisis Group (1999): Back to the Future: Milosevic Prepares for Life After Kosovo. ICG Balkans Report N°70, Belgrade-Podgorica, June 28, 1999.
International Crisis Group (2001): After Milošević. A Practical Agenda for Lasting Balkans Peace. Europe Report Nº108, April 1, 2001.
International Crisis Group (2004): Patten and Gelb to Co-Chair International Crisis Group. Brussels, September 9, 2004. (February 12, 2007)
International Crisis Group (2006): Kosovo Status: Delay Is Risky. Europe Report Nº177, November 10, 2006.
Jovanović, Igor (2006): Ahtisaari comment draws fire in Serbia. In: Southeast European Times, August 30, 2006. (February 11, 2007)
UN News Center (2005): Kosovo: Annan to name veteran trouble-shooter Ahtisaari to lead status talks. November 1, 2005. (February 11, 2007)
Wood, Nicholas: Serbs Criticize U.N. Mediator, Further Bogging Down Kosovo Talks. In: New York Times, September 2, 2006, p. 7.
Xharra, Jeta (2007): Interview: EU Mission 'to Coach Kosovo into Europe'. In: Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), February 01, 2007. (February 8, 2007)
An Ambivalent UN-Envoy
The envoy of the United Nations (UN) secretary-general for Kosovo’s future status process, Martti Ahtisaari, had tried in vain to negotiate such a compromise for a year. Kofi Annan announced to the UN security council, according to the UN News Center, "of his intention to appoint former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, a veteran United Nations trouble-shooter" on November 1, 2005. (UN News Center 2005)This decision turned out to be ambivalent. Ahtisaari had been the envoy who delivered to Belgrade the conditions to stop the NATO attack against Yugoslavia in 1999 which appears to have been perceived as challenge to impartiality. Reports on how he supposedly delivered these conditions were communicated in media close to Slobodan Milošević's government, and will have made their impacts even if they were propaganda as the International Crisis Group (ICG) suggested. (International Crisis Group 1999: 4)
Furthermore, between 2000-2004 Mr. Ahtisaari was Chairman of the ICG, an organization that has many important players of the "international community" on its board that were involved in Yugoslavia – including the NATO attack (for example Wesley Clark and Joschka Fischer). (International Crisis Group 2004) While Mr. Ahtisaari was ICG chairman, it produced a comprehensive report with "key recommendations":
"For Kosovo, that the reality, legitimacy and permanence of the split from Serbia be acknowledged; that early Kosovo-wide elections be held to establish a democratic leadership; that the final political settlement process then be commenced; and that the option of "c o n d i t i o n a l independence� be closely explored." (International Crisis Group 2001: X)
Finally in August 2006, Ahtisaari's image of impartiality was strained when he was said to have accused Serbs of a collective guilt. The Serbian negotiation team accused him to act against his mandate and to jeopardize the UN-mission. (B 92 2006, Jovanović 2006, Wood 2006)
Blueprint for the Ahtisaari-Plan for Kosovo
Meanwhile Mr. Ahtisaari has presented a proposal. It has to find consensus among the Contact Group (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, United Kingdom, United States) which sponsored the process. Consensus within the Contact Group deems necessary because an eventual UN-plan for the future of Kosovo has to pass the UN security council where the permanent members can veto it.Two of the permanent members, Russia and to a lesser extent China, have signalled reservation against changing the border status of the Republic of Serbia without its approval. In a report of November 2006, the International Crisis Group (ICG) urged to speed up the process. It also summarized its "recommendations":
"The six-nation Contact Group that has sponsored the process must at minimum deliver timely endorsement of the settlement package that UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari should present before January’s end, and the UN Security Council must pass a resolution superseding 1244 (1999) to allow the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to transfer its responsibilities to Kosovo’s government and pave the way for new international bodies being readied by the EU. Acting together, the U.S. and the EU need to show the political will to recognise Kosovo as independent, and fend off partition moves from Serbia and the Serb north of Kosovo." (International Crisis Group 2006: i)
No "Finessing of Both Sides"
ICG's language is unmistakably clear, there was to be no "luxury of "finessing of both sides":"Kosovo’s relative stability over the past year should not encourage the international community to imagine it has the luxury of finessing both sides. It has already indulged a
Serbian constitutional process intended to undermine the international community’s plans for Kosovo, helping thereby to consolidate Belgrade behind retrogressive electoral practices and ideologies of the Milosevic era." (International Crisis Group 2006: i)
ICG seems to have laid out matrix and timetable for its former president and now UN envoy Ahtisaari. The Serbian position that the UN Security Council cannot declare the province of Kosovo independent itself is considered "legally perfect but politically hopeless":
"Instead, the burden could be carried jointly by an enabling Security Council resolution that would endorse Ahtisaari's eventual package, wind up UNMIK and stipulate the details of a successor international presence, and by an act of self-determination by Pristina. Early ideas favoured a “take it or leave it� Kosovo referendum on the settlement package. Concerns that this would be too time-consuming, likely to spiral out of control and incite counter-referendums led top reference instead for the Kosovo Assembly to endorse the settlement package and declare independence on its basis, attracting thereafter recognitions from individual countries and, presumably, EU member states en bloc."(International Crisis Group 2006: 1)
Had it not been for the Russians, the process would have been quicker, in the language of ICG, it would have been put through with a "guillotine":
"[...] Russia has subsequently hardened its rhetoric against an imposed settlement and continues to resist the guillotine favoured, if now somewhat more provisionally, by the other Contact Group members for the process." (International Crisis Group: 2)
The talks have presumed after September 15, 2006, when UN Deputy envoy Albert Rohan considered the talks to have dead-ended. Considering the nature of these talks, it is not a surprise that these talks went nowhere:
"In divining results from the Vienna dialogue, UNOSEK has necessarily calibrated in favour of Pristina: it will have the responsibility of implementing the eventual settlement and is the international community’s partner in Kosovo institution-building [...] strongly encouraged by Western diplomats to believe that the process will result in independence. [...] Although not explicitly stated, the main purpose of the Vienna process has been to find a viable future for Kosovo Serbs within an independent Kosovo." (International Crisis Group: 3)
And it is with this respect that ICG considers the negotiation on part of Serbia successful. With neither the "international community" to admit having a plan B (DerStandard.at 2007a), nor the Serbian government (Standard 2007), it seems likely that one position will be defeated. The power relations do not leave much doubt over the outcome. The EU structure in Kosovo, mentioned in the Ahtisaari-plan which has not yet reached the UN Security Council, is already being prepared. (Xharra 2007)
The Ahtisaari-plan seems to adhere to the ICG blueprint for a kind of disguised independence of Kosovo. It is unacceptable for the Serbian state because it will be the first step to permanently alter its border. But it also seems to run into resistance of Kosovo-Albanians who see too much accommodation for Kosovo Serbs.
The acting Serbian government, which refused to talk to Mr. Ahtisaari when he visited Belgrade to present his plan, argued that it was not in the position to take decisions for a new government (currently being negotiated) and managed to postpone further talks in Vienna until February 21, 2007. In its constituting session on February 14, 2007, the newly formed Serbian parliament rejected the Ahtisaari-plan but agreed to send a negotiating team to Vienna. (DerStandard.at 2007b) The ICG blueprint envisages, however, a quick procedure for the first half of 2007:
"The value of a quick process in the Security Council is considerable. Upon its culmination, the U.S. could quickly recognise Kosovo. EU recognition may be less straightforward: “the harder and messier it is in New York, the more difficult it will be in the EU�. It will probably fall to the German EU presidency, from 1 January to 30 June 2007, to organise this. However, early clarity from the EU and its member states will be crucial: the office of the International Community Representative and its accompanying police and justice mission that are projected to follow on from UNMIK are to be mainly EU-resourced; preparing for eventual EU accession will be the key strategic goal for the young state as it consolidates its institutions." (International Crisis Group 2006: 1)
Sources
B 92 (2006): Koštunica: Ahtisaari’s message is clear. Belgrade, August 29, 2006. (February 12, 2007)DerStandard.at (2007a): Rohan: Verhandlungslösung im Kosovo-Konflikt nicht möglich. Interview with UN vice envoy Albert Rohan. (February 12, 2007)
DerStandard.at (2007b): Parlament wies UNO-Vorschlag Ahtisaaris zum Kosovo zurück. (February 16, 2007)
Der Standard (2007): "Alles außer UN-Sitz und Armee." Interview with the chief adviser of Serbian premier Vojislav Koštunica. In: Der Standard, February 10/11, 2007. p. 5.
International Crisis Group (1999): Back to the Future: Milosevic Prepares for Life After Kosovo. ICG Balkans Report N°70, Belgrade-Podgorica, June 28, 1999.
International Crisis Group (2001): After Milošević. A Practical Agenda for Lasting Balkans Peace. Europe Report Nº108, April 1, 2001.
International Crisis Group (2004): Patten and Gelb to Co-Chair International Crisis Group. Brussels, September 9, 2004. (February 12, 2007)
International Crisis Group (2006): Kosovo Status: Delay Is Risky. Europe Report Nº177, November 10, 2006.
Jovanović, Igor (2006): Ahtisaari comment draws fire in Serbia. In: Southeast European Times, August 30, 2006. (February 11, 2007)
UN News Center (2005): Kosovo: Annan to name veteran trouble-shooter Ahtisaari to lead status talks. November 1, 2005. (February 11, 2007)
Wood, Nicholas: Serbs Criticize U.N. Mediator, Further Bogging Down Kosovo Talks. In: New York Times, September 2, 2006, p. 7.
Xharra, Jeta (2007): Interview: EU Mission 'to Coach Kosovo into Europe'. In: Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), February 01, 2007. (February 8, 2007)
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