Serbia: Tug of War over Remains of Yugoslavia (III)
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) had been a work in progress, a society that experimented with constitutions, participation, workers' administration, and social property. The problematic constitution of 1974 finally allowed the six republics of SFRY (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia) and the two Serbian provinces (Kosovo and Metohija, and Vojvodina) to act like separate economies (allocation, international credits, trade). At the federal level (SFRY parliament) each republic and province had de facto veto power: Decisions could only be reached by consensus (8:0). Furthermore the provinces of Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina, gained the right to veto decisions in the Serbian parliament. Unsurprisingly this constitutional arrangement of 1974 was criticized in Serbia.The 1980s brought further structural and institutional changes for Yugoslavia that finally led to its disintegration. The background was an increasing pressure on the Yugoslav society. The SFRY was – like many other dependent societies – caught in the debt trap. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) represented creditor governments and imposed "conditionalities" that had one main rational: repayment of debts. The following widespread poverty and de-industrialization of the country aggravated the huge regional inequalities. (1)
Kosovo was clearly by far at the bottom of this divide. Yugoslavia had attempted to counterbalance these differences. The main recipient of inner-Yugoslav development finance was the province of Kosovo. Albanians in Kosovo were clearly better off than those living in Albania before the crisis of the 1980s hit Yugoslavia. These attempts to balance Yugoslav regional inequalities were, however, not very successful.
Ironically it was the open approach of the Yugoslav communists towards the different ethnic groups living in Yugoslavia which spurred further tensions. The Kosovo had a positive record in fighting illiteracy (in Albanian language) and in producing university alumni. The socio-economic situation of Kosovo did not produce, however, jobs for these young academic Kosovars. On the other hand, the SFRY allowed traditional structures to survive in Kosovo that had been pushed back by the "cultural revolution" in Albania. When the development attempts of the SFRY were answered by a bitter response with the riots of 1981, the Yugoslav communists were at their wits' end. 1981 was certainly a cesura, the relations in the Serbian republic of Yugoslavia were poisoned.
In the midst of the severe Yugoslav state crisis (worker mass protested the workers' state) there was a broad discussion on a new constitution. Amendments were agreed upon in 1988 but too late. In Slovenia attempts on an independent constitution had begun, the Yugoslav government retired in December 1988 amidst the state crisis. 1989 the Yugoslav presidential board imposed a state of emergency in Kosovo which forced the Kosovar parliament to accept a constitutional change for the province. This constitutional change had been triggered by a deal between Serbian and Slovenian politicians. (Weißenbacher 2005)
Molding International Law
A strive for independence depends on international support and recognition. In the case of the Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia 1991, it had been, above all, major parts of the German political elite – supported by their junior partners in Austria – that subscribed to interpretations of Yugoslav constitutional law and international law as put forward by the secessionist republics. Many of the German language media accompanied this process.The UN secretary general, the UN envoy, the president of the Yugoslav peace conference, the Bosnian president, the ambassadors of the United Kingdom and the USA had warned early that the conflict would escalate if the secessionist republics were too readily recognized. Nevertheless, Germany pressed the European Community (EC) for quick actions. (2) The EC proposed procedures, conditions, and schedules for recognition of independence that it did not abide. The outcome of these proceedings, the Badinter-Commission's recommendations, merely legitimized a policy that had already been implemented.
The bottom line of the struggle was the question of borders: Which borders were to be accepted as international borders? Who were to live inside which borders? Slovenian politicians clearly aimed at a recognition within the Slovenian administrative/domestic borders of SFRY. The Croatian president Franjo Tudjman seems to have followed a policy of integrating areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina (which he considered Croatian), before settling for Croatia's administrative borders. The other republics preferred some sort of Yugoslav integration model. Important questions were widely ignored: If Yugoslavia was considered a peoples' prison that had proven not to work, why should people be forced together in a new state with a similar composition (Bosnia-Herzegovina)? If peoples within the border of an existing state (Yugoslavia) would gain the right to secede, why was this right not extended to people(s) in then non-existing "states"?
The Badinter-Commission (BC) based its arguments in favor of making administrative borders to international ones mainly on two pillars: international law and the SFRY constitution. International law after World War II has treated borders of recognized states rather conservatively. Since Yugoslavia was an existing state, borderline changes needed explanation. The BC's approach: It deemed Yugoslavia in the process of dissolution. Furthermore it referred to the principle of uti possidetis ("as you possess") which declares existing administrative borders to become international ones.
In modern international law, it was used to avoid frictions in de-colonization processes. BC declared this principle to be a general one of international law, arguing with a case of the International Court of Justice (frontier dispute Burkina Faso vs. Mali). Peter Radan (2002) stressed, however, that BC used selective quoting to make a general principle out of a particular one (de-colonization). Similar approaches were used when interpreting principles of the SFRY constitution: Arguments supporting a secession and recognition of parts of Yugoslavia were stressed, while others, that make points in favor of SFRY integrity, were neglected.
All in all a "right" of self-determination was accepted for the Yugoslav republics within their Yugoslav domestic borders. This view neglected Yugoslav constitutional history and took side in a never decided Yugoslav discussion, whether there was a right of self-determination on part of the Yugoslav peoples in the constitution, and if, who the entity was to call upon such a "right".
When Yugoslavia was formed after World War II, the Yugoslav constitutional peoples did not have spaces and borders wherein they could have called for such a "right". (To be sure: this "right" excluded "nationalities" like Albanians or Hungarians.) Some argued that these peoples forfeited their right voluntarily by entering the Yugoslav federation, others stressed the growing strength of republics (and their borders) in the later constitutions. There had been no consensus on this issue. It was the Badinter-Commission (BC) which made this decision, on behalf of the European Community. (3)
The international borders of the recognized state Yugoslavia, however, were declared void in 1991, while its administrative borders were deemed unchangeable. A "right" of the Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia to succeed from an existing state was recognized while Bosnian Serb claims not to belong to a (future) Bosnian state were declined. These decisions ignored that it had not mattered for Serbs to which republic they belonged (and therefore territoriality was not very relevant) as long as they lived under the common umbrella of the Yugoslav constitution. With disintegration of Yugoslavia, it started to matter.
These decisions have been haunting former Yugoslavia ever since. Bosnia-Herzegovina has been kept together forcibly. Montenegro had been forced to stay in a common state with Serbia (until the recent peaceful divorce) in order not to set a precedence for Bosnia-Herzegovina or Kosovo. The next test case will be the Serbian province of Kosovo. A recognized Kosovo (against the "Badinter-legacy") could stimulate ambitions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and elsewhere.
Read in part IV: Blueprint for further Disintegration.
(1) Very briefly: In 1980 two things happened. Tito died and the international debt trap (credit crisis, "debt crisis") snapped. As many other dependent countries, Yugoslavia had got indebted, because of a mixture of taking the opportunity of a favorable situation (low real interest rates), hopes in a catching-up development, and international creditors that actively and negligently sold credits due to enormous international availability in the 1970s. (Global recession had made investments in the productive sector less profitable which made more money available in the financial sector. Oil producers earned more income following their concerted price policy.)
In 1979 US policy made interest rates explode from one day to the other, and credits scarce and expensive. The International Monetary Funds (IMF) represented creditor countries in order to secure repayments. It forced conditionalities of a one-policy-fits-all type on debtor countries. Agreements with the IMF aimed at keeping up repayments of credits. SFRY kept paying its debt even in the harshest situation and during the beginning of disintegration in its last year of existence. Beside causing poverty and de-industrialization, IMF policies intended constitutional changes: re-centralization of decision making power to the federal state (and the central bank).
Unfortunately for Yugoslavs, the new constitution of 1974 faced a full reality check only after Tito's death. And this was a time of crisis. Up to then, the power of the League of Communists had not vanished (with a structure that allowed – other than the constitution – simple majority decisions), and Tito himself had an especiallypowerful role, in the League of Communists and as Yugoslav president for life-time.
The 1980s witnessed a broad discussion on how to build a new constitution. The political framework (domestically and internationally) made adaptations necessary but the republics and provinces had too much power to let go. The rich northern republics prepared to leave SFRY. The confrontation within the Republic of Serbia (Kosovo) escalated.
(2) The Austrian Foreign Secretary at that time, Alois Mock, who was known for his support of Slovenian and Croatian interpretations, could "not comprehend" the causality of critics, that predicted an escalation of the conflict if (early) recognition was conceded. Denial of recognition would rather, so Mock, "encourage the Serb-dominated army in its policy of conquest". (Possaner 1991)
Robert Howse, Canadian scholar of international law who worked in the Canadian embassy in Belgrade in the 1980s, described the implications:
"The concern with "rewarding aggression" that one frequently hears in discussions of the Bosnian situation is understandable, given that the recognition of Bosnia (in my view, one of the greatest errors in the entire international response to the crisis) seemed to imply that the borders of this newly independent state represented a kind of legitimate status quo ante disturbed by Serb and Croatian aggression. It is perhaps time to admit the error of the West (and the international community more generally) in providing recognition to the breakaway republics without confronting the difficulty minority problems that raised in all but the Slovenian case." (Howse 1995: 10c.)
Many supporters of a quick recognition of Slovenia and Croatia displayed an ignorance towards a feasible reintegration concept for the remains of Yugoslavia. The fact that they succeeded does not mean that there were no alternative proposals in 1991. The Dutch Government that had the EC chair in the second half of 1991 appears to have put forward to its fellow EC members a proposal that stated "the principle of self-determination e.g. cannot exclusively apply to the existing republics while being deemed inapplicable to national minorities within those republics".
It called "for a comprehensive solution which involves all republics and the federal government [of Yugoslavia, R.W.]" This proposal to open the possibility to redraw Yugoslav domestic boundaries was rejected by the other EU-members. (Owen 1996: 2cc.)
Others, like the Austrian industrialist Josef Taus (Austrian Christian-Conservative Party, OeVP) and the Austrian Social Democrat Peter Jankowitsch sensed the "anachronism of a drifting apart of Yugoslavia in a phase of general integration efforts". (Bacher-Dalma 1991)
(3) The International Crisis Group, an organization which has important players of the "international community" on its board, made this point clearly in a report from 2001: "The former SFRY constitution, confusingly, also referred to the location of sovereignty in the constituent peoples that made up the SFRY. However, this latter definition was explicitly rejected when the European Community chose to recognise only the right of former Yugoslav republics to exercise their sovereignty, and not peoples." (International Crisis Group 2001)
Sources
Bacher-Dalma, Inge (1991): Schrebergärten in Europas Binnenmarkt. In: Der Standard, June 18, 1991, p. 3.Howse, Robert (1995): A Horizon beyond Hatred? Introductory Reflections. In: Payam Akhavan and Robert Howse (ed.): Yugoslavia the Former and Future. Reflections by Scholars from the Region. Geneva [United Nations Research Institute for Social Development], pp. 1-12.
International Crisis Group (2001): After Milošević. A Practical Agenda for Lasting Balkans Peace. Europe Report Nº108, April 1, 2001.
Owen, David (1996): Balkan Odyssey. London [1995].
Possaner, Georg (1991): US-Intervention vor Anerkennung. In: Der Standard, December 16, 1991, p. 2.
Radan, Peter (2002): The Break-up of Yugoslavia and International Law. London and New York. (= Routledge Studies in International Law 2)
Weißenbacher, Rudy (2005): Jugoslawien. Politische Ökonomie einer Desintegration. Wien.
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